The World Tour Final is an invitational event, contested by the best-performing pairs from a collection of premier events around the world in 2024; events such as the NABC, Gold Coast Teams, South American Championships, Swedish Bridge Festival and the HCL International Teams.

The two-day event was broadcast with expert commentary on the ACBL's YouTube channel, with a 30-minute delay (which allowed the players to occasionally drop in to discuss the boards they had just played).

This article will follow the journey of the two Australian / NZ pairs: Sartaj Hans and Andy Hung, and 2022 World Pairs silver medallists Nabil Edgtton and Michael Whibley.

Whibley - Edgtton took a big hit on this early board:

Whibley tried to offer 6 as a contract, but it was too late in the auction, and Edgtton was not willing to play in his singleton.

With the rest of the field playing in a minor, there was a lot at stake in 6. Edgtton ruffed the A lead, cashed the K, and ran the diamonds, throwing all of the losers from hand. North was unable to ruff, but eventually declarer had to ruff in hand and concede two trump tricks to South, losing 15.4 imps.

The winning line was to ruff one of the first four diamonds (reentering dummy with a club finesse), to reach this ending:

Declarer throws a club on the diamond, and continues with a club from dummy. If South still refuses to ruff, declarer ruffs and endplays South in trumps.

The most impressive auction on the deal came from Plackett - Erichsen:

Over Ola Rimstedt's 6 sacrifice, East's pass promised first-round control of spades, encouraging West to bid 7. West was happy to oblige, expecting any minor-suit finesses to be working. EW would have made 7, and they took 1400 from the 7 sacrifice, for a gain of 5.6 imps.

Sitting in different directions, both pairs picked up a large swing here:

Michael Whibley (and Antonio Sementa at another table) led the A to take a look at dummy, followed by the obvious club switch. The K was the setting trick, for 6.9 imps to the defenders.

At every other table, East led a spade. Where declarer was in 5, he ran the lead to the queen and made eleven tricks for 9.1 imps. Where declarer was in 4, he rose with the ace and cashed the AK, playing safe for ten tricks and a one-imp loss.

On one of the flattest boards in the event, the auction was the same at all the non-Australian tables:

The only exceptions to this auction were when Nabil or Sartaj were in the South seat. Playing transfers in competition, they were able to get their hearts into the auction:

At this point the auctions diverged: Hung bid 3, making the same +110 as all the pairs in 2, while Whibley decided to give his opponents a problem and gamble on 3NT. The defenders are entitled to three spade tricks, plus the Q and A, but East's opening lead of the J was fatal. Declarer won with the king and played diamonds from the top (unblocking the jack). West took his Q and switched to spades, setting up declarer's ninth trick in that suit for 10 imps to Whibley - Edgtton.

A passive heart exit from West might have forced declarer to work harder, ultimately leading to this position after the diamonds have been cashed:

Declarer needs to exit with a club now (and read the ending), or else South will be squeezed when the king-ace of spades are cashed. In fact, declarer will have a slightly easier time if he shelves the last diamond, and plays a club one trick earlier – with the defenders having just three of the last five tricks, declarer can comfortably keep the Q and 3 in hand, with the Q and K in dummy.

On Board 10, several declarers made 4 by guessing the Q (or receiving a heart lead) but the contract can be made even with a losing heart guess:

North led the K. Declarer won with the ace, ran the J (winning) and played another spade to the queen and Sartaj's king. Sartaj returned a third spade to East's ace, and when declarer crossed to the K and ran the jack, he could not avoid four losers for 10.9 imps to Hans - Hung.

Despite being in the middle of an extremely bad day, 2022 World Pairs champion Krzysztof Buras showed how the hand should be played. He won the K lead with the ace, and immediately ruffed a diamond. After crossing to the K and ruffing a third diamond with the queen (South discarding a heart), the contract was in no danger. He eventually lost a trick to the now-bare Q, and allowed South to take two trump tricks, but that was still ten tricks and 2.9 imps.

The transfers in competition proved their worth again on this board, with Whibley - Edgtton being the only pair to reach 4 from the right side:

One pair played in 4 after the auction started 1-dbl-1, but this contract failed quickly when West led a spade through dummy's king-jack. If you must be in game, this is the way to do it:

Whibley captured the 5 lead with dummy's ace, and, with the high cards marked in the East hand, recognised that drawing trumps was the safest line of play. A heart went to the queen and king, and East returned another club. Whibley ruffed this in hand so that he could lead the next trump through East, and East rose with the ace to play a third club. Whibley won this with the K, drew the last trump, and cashed diamonds for the rest of the tricks and 10.5 imps. If diamonds had not been 3-3, he would have had Q onside as a backup plan.

This was the only making game on the board, but one other pair found there was some value in defending spades:

Duboin and Cima defended accurately for 500: A, K, Q, A (North throwing a heart), club ruff, and North played back a low diamond to ensure that South remembered to ruff. The fourth club was ruffed, giving the defenders the first seven tricks, and declarer still had a spade loser to come (thanks to North's heart pitch on the A, preventing declarer from reaching dummy with a heart ruff).

Here's a bidding problem (neither side vulnerable):

A3    AQ109543    AQ73    –

It's a situation that many pairs might not have discussed, but it is a good idea to play 4NT here as a two-way bid: either two-suited, or a normal 5 bid. Using this method, you can play a direct 5 bid (bypassing 4NT) as showing slam interest.

The field was mostly split between 5 and 4NT; the 4NT bidders, and just one of the 5 bidders, were raised to 6.

One West took a different approach:

Presumably with no way to show a good 5 bid, Fleisher chose an overbid of 6, and his partner felt that two keycards might be enough to provide the thirteenth trick.

The full deal:

The grand slam was one off, for 11.9 imps to Hans - Hung.

Judging from the fact that all of the 4NT bidders were raised to 6, it seems that these pairs were playing 4NT as stronger than 5. I prefer to play the direct 5 as the stronger bid, to avoid ambiguity in this auction:

If 5 can be either a normal hand with clubs and hearts, or a very strong hand with hearts, it will be impossible for East to know when to bid on.

Today, East bid 5 over 4NT, so the 5 rebid was unambiguous – West would correct 5 to 5 with a two-suited hand – but that just strikes me as a lucky escape for this method. If East's diamonds had been longer than his clubs, he would have bid 5 instead of 5, and would have interpreted West's correction to 5 as a two-suiter with clubs and hearts, rather than a strong hand.

This next board is remarkable because three of the eight EW pairs bid and made 3NT with six top losers. See if you think you would have done better than the three world-class pairs who let 3NT make here:

North led the 9, won by declarer's king. If West had shown a stopper, this lead makes some sense (playing South for an entry to lead through the Qxx) but it doesn't seem right when East was the one who made the decision to bid 3NT.

Not a great start for the defence, but declarer still had only eight tricks. He ran the diamonds and clubs, putting South on lead with the third club in this position:

Looking at all four hands, this looks like a trivial problem, but sometimes even the best players can fall victim to a faulty line of reasoning. South felt that North would have led a heart from ace-king-sixth (I know I would) so he played for this equally-unlikely layout:

Assuming the contract to be unbeatable, South played a spade, attempting to prevent the overtrick. An unexpected ten tricks for Sartaj, for 8.4 imps.

There were two other tables where 3NT made. Welland - Auken had a similar auction, but with West implying a stopper, and North led a fourth-best heart, conceding the ninth trick immediately. But my favourite result was Jerome Rombaut, who bid 3NT over a 3 opening. South led the 6, and Rombaut put up dummy's jack. Believing the lead to be from 64, Pszczola ducked to maintain communications.

Having worked their way up to fourth and seventh place, Hans - Hung and Edgtton - Whibley now had to play each other. The match was uneventful, with a small loss seeing Hans - Hung fall just one position.

In the next match, both of our pairs gained 9 imps on this board:

Declarer won the spade lead with the queen, and had time to set up just one minor-suit trick for three tricks in total, and 1100 to the Aussies.

Only three of the eight NS pairs managed to take a large penalty on this deal, with some pairs failing to find the double of 1NT on the North cards, and one player inexplicably pulling the double with the South cards.

With neither partner having a five-card suit, and no guarantee of an eight-card fit, it’s theoretically a losing proposition to run from 1NT doubled, but with not much to lose, the American pair gave it an optimistic shot:

2 was a worse spot than 1NT, with 1400 on offer, but our boys weren’t unhappy collecting 1100.

The benefit of running in these auctions, is that you might not get doubled in your new contract, but this benefit is more likely to arise if you start running before you are doubled. Roy Welland won the board for his side by getting out early, taking advantage of his non-standard methods over 1NT:

2 is clearly a worse contract than 1NT, but we live in a world of takeout doubles – the worse a contract is, the harder it is to double it. North’s 2 made 11 tricks, a far cry from the 1400 available in 2 doubled.

In the penultimate match, Sartaj and Andy played Pszczola - Buras, who were running in last place. This high-scoring match has been reported in full in the ABF Newsletter, and at the end of that match, Sartaj and Andy had taken a large lead in the event with just one six-board match to go.

In the final match, Hans - Hung faced Versace - Sementa, who were running in third place, while 5th-placed Whibley - Edgtton faced Donati - Percario who were out of contention in 9th place.

The match did not begin well for Hans - Hung:

Sartaj's 5 bid looks like the normal action, and four other Wests also bid on to the five-level over 4 (although Sartaj was the only one who mentioned the diamonds). Failing in 5 was an 8-imp loss for Hans - Hung, but they were guaranteed a loss on the board as soon as North bid 4. Two Norths did not find the 4 sacrifice over 4 (leaving EW with 620 or 790), and one South sacrificed over 6 (EW 800).

The scores were packed tightly going into the last couple of boards, with Delimpaltadakis - Vroustis slightly ahead of Sementa - Versace and Hans - Hung, and Whibley - Edgtton some way off the pace in fifth behind Welland - Auken.

The last two boards were both eight-card heart fits with EW, with 27 HCP on the first and 26 HCP on the second, and uninteresting NS hands, so there wasn't much hope of a bidding swing. Still, with less than an imp separating the top three places, Hans - Hung were in with a chance if they could generate an overtrick on one of the boards.

On Board 23, Joe Grue and Brad Moss bid a poor slam, going off and donating imps to all of the other EW pairs who were all in 4 (including Hans - Hung and Whibley - Edgtton) at the expense of the NS pairs (including the two leading pairs). This was more than enough for Hans - Hung to take the lead – and, just to be safe, they also managed to find the overtrick imp they needed in 4.

They extended their lead on the final board:

The 1 opening looks a little strange, and this is because EW open all balanced hands (outside the 14-16 1NT range) with 1, including those with a five-card major. This placed them in the unusual position of defending 2 in a nine-card fit, with an undisclosed eight-card major fit of their own. West's double of 2 suggests a penalty double of 1, rather than a strict takeout of clubs, so West's pass was not completely unreasonable, but 2 doubled made for EW 180, knocking Welland - Auken down to sixth place.

Martin Fleisher, playing a similar method, also opened 1 on the West cards, and he also failed to find the heart fit, ending in 3NT down two on the A lead. Meanwhile, Grue and Moss also doubled 2 for -180 on the same auction as Welland and Auken (although their 1 opening was Precision).

These three pairs, all failing to find their 26-point heart game, produced a total loss of 25 imps, which were distributed as plus scores to the other five EW pairs (again, at the expense of the NS pairs). Hans - Hung collected 4.5 imps for making 420, and Whibley - Edgtton collected 5.2 imps for their 450, while NS pairs Delimpaltadakis - Vroustis and Sementa - Versace fell by the same amounts.

The final scores:

1 Sartaj Hans - Andy Hung +50.74

2 Nabil Edgtton - Michael Whibley +40.25

3 Antonio Sementa - Alfredo Versace +38.71

I've shown a lot of boards where the winners benefited from errors by their opponents, because even at top level, that's how events like this are decided. In an interview by Rob Barrington, Sartaj was asked for his thoughts on the error rate in the world-class field:

"Last night after we won, I felt that we got incredibly lucky. We got some big boards and some big gifts, and I thought we just got lucky. But this morning when I woke up, I reflected on the two days, and I thought, yeah, we got our share of luck, but we didn't do too many crazy, silly things ourselves, and maybe that was the reason we won. So I'm feeling a bit more of a worthy winner today." Andy added, "The luck runs pretty evenly amongst everyone... it's all about limiting the disasters that happen to you along the way."

Barrington summed up: "Steve Weinstein says we're all basically terrible; we're all trying to make the best of our worst decisions as many times as possible, and the best players and the best pairs just kind of navigate those minefields. You guys did a great job of that in your two days."

Congratulations Andy and Sartaj!

In many circles, psyching (making a bid that grossly misstates your strength and/or distribution) is seen as distasteful, rude, or even considered cheating. Yet psyching is an integral part of bridge that has been around since the early days of the game. Psychic bids represent the ultimate expression of the "poker" element of bridge. You can never be one hundred percent sure what cards someone holds and this principle of imperfect information is what makes bridge such a fascinating game.

Making a bid that shows something you don't have is not only fun, but it can also be very exciting. If you have ever pulled off a successful psyche, you will know what I am talking about – that pregnant pause as your opponents try to work out exactly what is going on! I am a firm believer that psyching not only produces a unique element of joy and satisfaction in bridge, but that psyching can sometimes be the best bid on a hand. Players who never psyche are giving up a vital tool from their kit.

You don't believe me that psyching can be worthwhile – or perhaps even the strongest bid? Let's take a look at the conditions under which psyching has the best chance of accomplishing something for your side.

Back in the "good old days" of bridge, opening the bidding in first position with a psyche was not an unknown strategy. These days, unless a team is trailing by a large margin in a match, it is virtually unheard of. Because partner can have a hand of any strength, there is a just as a good a chance of catching partner off-guard as the opponents. Besides, this sort of bid is random and destructive and is unlikely to lead to good results.

If partner has limited their strength, the picture changes completely. Now you know that partner won't carry you off to lofty heights and it also becomes more likely that the hand belongs to the opponents. Some situations where partner has implied that their strength is limited:

 

A gentle "psyche" you might try is this old chestnut. In third seat, you pick up:

AJ9    AKJ5    543    AQ8

After two passes, instead of your usual 1 opening you might decide to try 1 instead. The goal of this bid is to tempt your LHO into a non-diamond lead against your eventual 3NT contract. Because partner is a passed hand, they are not likely to raise you to 5, and it will be very rare that they will be tempted to bid past 3NT if they have the option.

If you were in first seat, opening 1 would be reckless. Partner is unlimited, and with four diamonds and a good hand opposite you might quickly find yourself at the helm of an unnecessarily high diamond contract. The safety element is simply not present, and there is no real point in mis-describing your hand.

If you are making a psyche where you intend to play the hand if your opponents let you, by definition you won't have the strength or suit length to justify being there! This means that if you are vulnerable, the price you will pay for going down in your ridiculous contract will not be worthwhile.

Going down fifty points a trick can be beneficial, and even going six or seven down can show a tidy profit if the opponents can make a vulnerable game. This means that if you are going to go for a flight of fancy where you are likely to end up as declarer, the best time to do it is at favourable vulnerability (you are not vulnerable but your opponents are).

Psyches don't always work, and you don't want to put yourself in a position where if the opponents work it out you will end up having a disaster. Effective psyches follow the principle that if it works, wonderful, while if it doesn't, no harm done.

When experts psyche, it is highly unusual to find them with a weak balanced hand. Usually they have strong support for their partner's suit, or a long suit of their own to run to if the going gets rough.

Let's look at a real-life hand played against one of the best pairs in Australia:

Nye Griffiths was able to take advantage of several attractive factors on this hand to produce an outrageous psyche that made finding the best slam impossible for the opponents. Not only had his partner opened with a preempt (they were now effectively out of the auction, giving responder carte blanche), but the vulnerability was ideal and the extreme club fit gave a convenient escape route if necessary. It was also clear that the opponents had a vulnerable game and possibly a slam on.

Over 4, note that the affected opponent knew there was mischief afoot but could do nothing about it. Even if East had bid 5 trying to express that she had a huge hand with hearts and was attempting to "expose the psyche", this would likely have been interpreted as artificial.

Knowing that one (or both) of the opponents must be void in clubs, Nye tried the lead of the A against 6. When dummy was revealed it became clear that playing a spade, diamond or club would lead to declarer claiming the rest, so he tried a second heart for me to ruff: one down. Out of seventeen tables, this was the only one where North-South managed a plus score.

In a similar way to preemptive openings, limited strength opening bids give responder a lot more freedom to express their flair and tell a few tall tales. This hand is from the last set of the 2016 GNOT grand final in Tweed Heads:

Opposite a limited opening bid, several factors were clear from the West seat after the first three calls: the opponents must have 25+ points, South must have 15+ points, and partner won't be able to take us too high given that they have limited their hand. Given the vulnerability, deceptive action had a low level of danger and a big upside if the opponents could be talked out of their vulnerable game.

While a preemptive 3 would take up a bit of room, the main goal of convincing the opponents that it was not their hand would not be accomplished. Once the goal becomes clear, bidding 1NT looks right: it shows about 7-10 points (so both North and South might think that we had the balance of strength) and it also shows strength in spades (convincing the opponents that if their bid is marginal, our announced "trump tricks" should suggest that they stay low).

Who should be blamed out of North and South for defending 1NT non-vulnerable with 27 combined high-card points? Many would say South, but he is in an exposed position: if South doubles and West redoubles ("I really meant it – I have 10 points and I my plan is to collect a vulnerable penalty"), South might find his partner with the yarborough rather than responder.

Given that North is a passed hand, he can't have much more strength than he actually holds. Because North is limited and maximum, and the various other factors are in play (unfavourable vulnerability, opponents have a limited opening bid, and so on), there is a lot to be said for doubling to let partner know that it might be our hand, and this would have saved the day this time.

1NT by West went down four for -200, while at the other table West passed and North was the one to bid 1NT. South raised to 3NT and made nine tricks for +600 and a 9-imp pickup.

How would you handle the following hand with only your side vulnerable?

AQ754    KJ65    A83    2

After two passes, you open 1. Left-hand opponent bids 1NT, passed back to you. Anything to say?

Bidding 2 could easily run into trouble. LHO appears to have spades, and if RHO has hearts your side may have no fit and less than half the points – not a good recipe for declaring the hand. Partner had a chance to double 1NT for penalty to show a maximum passed hand, so you might reasonably conclude that there is very little chance of missing a game by passing out 1NT.

At the table, this hand passed out 1NT. In the context of this article, bidding may be a lot more appealing if you sense some mischief is afoot! The full deal:

Sitting in the South seat was New Zealand international Michael Whibley. West wasn't particularly close to acting over 1NT, and North had about as much as he could have to pass 1NT, but 4 was still cold. Meanwhile, after partner's spade lead against 1NT, East had to switch to hearts to prevent the indignity of Whibley making his semi-psychic 1NT contract!

You don't think much of East's pass? Don't be too harsh – East was a top Swedish player whose name you might well recognise. At the other table, South overcalled a more pedestrian 2 and whether West bids 2 or makes a negative double, 4 is easily reached.

By now there are a few familiar features of this hand: the psycher's partner being limited (this time a passed hand), the favourable vulnerability, and an escape route if doubled. Finally, if South finds that his overcall gets raised to game by partner, he may well make it with a spade stopper and a secret weapon that could easily be worth six tricks!

Each of the above bids was made by an experienced player in a serious competition with the goal of getting a winning score. This should convince you that an occasional psyche might be a reasonable strategy if the conditions call for it. But it is important not to get carried away.

Psyching should be the exception rather than the norm. If partner is getting to the point where they "know" you have psyched before the opponents do, you are developing a partnership understanding and you will have to quit your habit or start alerting the opponents. Likewise, if your partner begins to treat your bids with a certain degree of scepticism, you have likely taken things too far.

You should also be careful who you psyche against. Turning up to your local club duplicate and bidding non-existent suits is not likely to make you many friends, and what's the point? Psyching against weak players at large tournaments is also inappropriate – they are turning up to have a good time, and disturbing the peace with some chicanery is uncalled for (and unnecessary). But if you are playing against other competitive players, and the time feels right, go for it. And don't feel bad about it.

The final key to effective psyching is creativity. If you dredge up the same old psyche that your opponents have seen before, they are far more likely to get it right than if you create something fresh. I'll leave you with this piece of genius from one of the usual suspects, Zia Mahmood:

As dealer, Zia opened a quiet 1 which was passed around to South who doubled for takeout. Content to wait, Zia passed, North bid 1 and Eric Rodwell bid 1 in the East chair. South bid 3, and can you guess Zia's next bid?

He bid 4! You read that correct – he raised his partner to game with a void.

North competed to 5, passed back to Zia. Can you really believe what Zia did next? He pushed on to 5, continuing to "support" his partner with not a spade to be found in his hand.

It's hard to blame South for doubling 5 – wouldn't you? – and Zia finally revealed his true intentions at the six-level. South doubled 6, North chose to lead a club, and when dummy's ten won and the queen dropped in the next two rounds, Zia had an overtrick. You just have to smile and take that one on the chin!